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6.3. Russian Financial Development Institutions: Their Rise and Main  
Challenges on the Path toward Improvement of Their Performance1 
It is already for roughly a decade and a half that the RF Government undertook various ef-
forts to build and fine-tune the financial development institutions in the country. This direc-
tion of the national economic policy is congruent with the common international practice: 
there exist a string of tasks and fundamental reasons behind many nations’ strive to shape up 
development institutions and support their operation2.  
In their general form, major drivers for governments to shape up and improve the devel-
opment institutions’ performance are associated with the need to compensate for market fail-
ures, lower risks facing private investors, secure substantial positive externalities, assist in 
overcoming various barriers and cutting down transaction costs, ensure “synchronization” of 
changes in the economic subjects’ behavior. Hence it is not accidental that the most typical 
development institutions’ operational areas include boosting expansion of small- and medium 
sized businesses, backing import-export operations, infrastructure development, bolstering 
regional development, support of individual sectors of an economy (agriculture as a model 
example).  
As a marginal note, there is no any strict definition of the phenomenon of development in-
stitution. We believe that experts are keen to define it as some kind organization (forms of 
whose incorporation may vary) which exhibits a combination of at least some of the following 
signs:  
− it was created on the government’s initiative and with its participation; 
− it centers on compensating for market failures and securing a demonstration effect; 
− it is financed through one-time government contribution (in that case, such funding sug-
gests it loss-free operation) or on the basis of regular budget appropriations; 
− its operations pursues a long-term prospect, attainment of set for it strategic objectives; 
− it operates on the basis of a specific legal base and special regulatory requirements; 
− it focuses on employing private-public partnership mechanisms; 
− as far as tactical decision making is concerned, it is autonomous from the government. 
By various estimates there are a few hundreds of development institutions worldwide, and 
they fall under different classifications3 (e.g., basing the nature of services they deliver); how-
ever, one singles out, as a rule, the group of financial development institutions, which operate 
in various forms, including, inter alia, development banks, funds and agencies4.  
                                                 
1 The present Section was prepared in 2011 using findings of a project “Institutional analysis of problems of 
functioning of the financial development institutions system for the benefit of the support of innovation activity” 
completed by the Interdepartmental analytical center at the commission of the Russian Academy of National 
Economy and Civil Service under the President of Russian Federation. 
2 For more details about the concept and typology of development institutions, objectives, tasks and directions of 
their operations, see: O.G. Solntsev, M.Yu. Khromov, R.G. Volkov. Development institutions: an analysis and 
assessment of the international record. Problems of prognostication, 2009, No. 2. 
3 See, for example, a presentation by I.G. Sokolov, Research Fellow of the Gaidar Institute “Development Insti-
tutions and the budget: results and prospects” (July 2011 г.). 
4 For a more detailed classification and examples of public development institutions overseas, see presentation 
by Gref G.O., the RF Minister of Economic Development and Trade: “On creation of a public financial devel-
opment institution (On the bill “On the Development Bank”)” (December 2006). 
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While citing the need for a government’s interference to compensate for market failures 
with regard to innovation development in particular1, experts, at the same time, point at cer-
tain risks associated with such interference. As to the risks associated with the public devel-
opment institutions, it is appropriate to single out the following ones: 
− reallocation of support in favor of inefficient companies;  
− “seizure” by the state of projects its supports; 
− generation of sizeable biases into the market environment;  
− substitution for private expenses. 
In general it is believed that to lower such risks, nations need to employ more sophisticated 
systems of corporate governance and institutional organization.  
6 . 3 . 1 .  M a i n  S t a g e s  o f  t h e  R i s e  o f  t h e  R u s s i a n  S y s t e m  
o f  F i n a n c i a l  D e v e l o p me n t  I n s t i t u t i o n s   
From our perspective, it is possible to provisionally identify five main stages in the process 
of the rise and advancement of development institutions in Russia since the late 1990s. (see 
Table 15). Our phasing to a significant degree is determined by changes in the state’s resource 
capacity and a certain evolution, at the government level, of prevailing notions of the urgency 
and significance of support to innovation development “against the backdrop” of other direc-
tions of public policy.  
Overall, until 2007 the mode of Russian development institutions’ development had been 
an evolutionary one: the evolution suggested a gradual (and not that costly for the budget) 
fine-tuning of individual vehicles of support to investment and innovation projects, which 
were implemented largely in the frame of assistance to the small- and medium-sized entrepre-
neurship (hereinafter - SME). At the time, implementation of a policy implying the economy 
diversification and innovation policy went on the back burner as far as the government (as 
well as allocation of budget resources) was concerned and was reduced to individual experi-
ments and random initiatives. 
The switch to an intense shaping up of financial development institutions and fuelling a 
substantial expansion of their resource base occurred in 2007. Behind that was a political de-
cision2 to use a fraction of resources under management of the National Welfare Fund (some 
Rb 300bn) to capitalize several development institutions. In all likelihood there were numer-
ous and heterogenic reasons behind the decision, but we assume a fundamental one was a 
strive for a certain compromise in the conditions where for one part the government was un-
der a mounting pressure of advocates of a significant increase of public investment in the 
economy (enemies to a further accumulation of public financial reserves), while on the other 
hand, the government bent an ear to staunch champions of macroeconomic stability who had 
managed to organize a systemic resistance to an increase in the level of public spending. In-
vesting a fraction of accumulated public financial resources in development institutions would 
“link” them to their future investment use, without giving a strong boost to public spending.  
Meanwhile, the Russian leadership’s view on the main role of the national financial institu-
tions system underwent several changes over the past five years. Back in 2007, extension of 
the development institutions’ mandate was linked primarily to the task of the economy diver-
                                                 
1 Igniting innovation: rethinking the role of government in emerging Europe and Central Asia / Itzhak Goldberg 
[et al.]. The World Bank, 2011. 
2 The Address by the RF President to the Federal Assembly of RF of 26 April 2007.   
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sification, advancement of its individual sectors, lifting infrastructure barriers. By contrast, in 
2009-2010 the emphasis was already made on “fine-tuning” of the development institutions 
system1 for the sake of implementation of the innovation policy, technological modernization, 
attraction of additional investments, with account, inter alia, of an insufficiently favorable 
investment climate.  
Table 15 
Main Stages of Emergence of the Development Institutions System  
Period External conditions Key developments Peculiarities 
1999–2000 Tight budget constraints, encouragement 
of innovations is on the periphery of 
public policy  
The Russian Development Bank * and 
the Venture Innovation Bank are cre-
ated** 
Emphasis on creation of relatively small 
self-financing institutions  
2004–2006 Budgets constraints softened, a steady 
economic growth, greater attention to its 
“quality”  
The Russian Development Bank 
launched the program of support of SME 
through regional partners; the Fund for 
Assistance to Development of Small 
Forms of Enterprises in the Research and 
Technical Sphere launched the “Start” 
program; the rise of regional venture 
funds; establishment of the Russian 
Venture Company (RVC); decision 
made to establish the Russian Invest-
ment Fund for ICT  
Emphasis on the regional support of 
SME  
2007–2008 A huge volume of budget revenues, 
encouragement of innovation as one of 
major public policy avenues, an attempt 
to link substantial resources to individ-
ual directions of development  
Establishment of public corporations: 
the Bank of Development and Foreign 
Economic Acitivity (Vnesheconom-
bank), the Russian Corporation for 
Nanotechnologies (Rosnanotech) ***  
Launch of the biggest institutions 
Late 2008 – 
2009 
The economic crisis, slashing of re-
sources spent on encouragement of 
innovation along with a greater attention 
to the effectiveness of measures imple-
mented  
Most of resources temporarily with-
drawn from Rosnanotech; the Fund for 
Assistance to Development of Small 
Forms of Enterprises in the Research and 
Technical Sphere launches the “Anti-
crisis” program instead of a string of 
earlier implemented ones; the Seed 
Investment Fund is established under 
RVC 
A vigorous use of the institutions and/or 
their resources to implement the anti-
crisis policy; the beginning of the proc-
ess of establishment of the “second-tier” 
institutions  
since 2010 Improvement of the economic situation, 
attempts to learn lessons from the crisis, 
innovations form one of top priorities 
declared by the state  
RVC and ROSNANO founded a range 
of new institutions, including those 
centering on infrastructure, and funds 
overseas; establishment of the Founda-
tion for Development of the New Tech-
nologies Development and Commer-
cialization Centre (“Skolkovo 
Foundation”); on the government’s 
initiative Vnesheconombank founds the 
Russian Fund for Direct Investment 
(RFDI) and the Russian Agency for 
Export Credit and Investment Insurance 
(EXIAR); the Russian Development 
Bank begins implementing a program on 
support of modernization and innovation  
A vigorous process of establishment of 
new institutions; expansion of interna-
tional operations; a greater attention paid 
to improvement of the investment cli-
mate  
* Currently JSC Russian Bank for Small and Medium Enterprises Support (JSC SME Bank). 
** The first public development institution created by the “fund of funds” model in 2000 to support the venture 
industry. However, it began operating only in 2000 and at a fairly moderate scale, because of a relatively humble 
capital of Rb 100mn of which, as suggested by data available, only a half was financed, and due to a very strict 
cap (10%) on participation in venture funds’ capital . 
*** In March 2011was transformed into joint-stock company – JSC ROSNANO.  
The record of the emergence of the Russian development institutions system to date (see 
Fig. 1) allows the following conclusions: 
                                                 
1 See in particular: Minutes of the meeting of the Commission under the RF President on modernization and 
technological development of Russia’s economy of 25 November 2009.  
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1) the period between late 1990s and 2008 saw a gradual shift toward shaping up institu-
tions focused on support of projects at their later stages. In this respect a milestone develop-
ment became the rise of the public corporations Vnsehseconombank and Rosnanotech. But 
since 2009 some of the then existing development institutions (RVC and ROSNANO) have 
expanded their operations to encompass earlier stages too. Plus, the newly created institutions 
(“Skolkovo” Foundation in particular) have become to a significant extent focused on support 
of projects at their early stages too; 
2) there exists a steady trend to expansion of both the institutions and Funds’ resources and 
the size of projects they support: while between late 1990s and early 2000s it was largely 
“low-cost” instruments (the Fund for Assistance to Development of Small Forms of Enter-
prises in the Research and Technical Sphere, the Venture Innovation Fund, the Russian De-
velopment Bank), a number of institutions (Vnesheconombank, Rosnanotech, RFSI), which 
were created later, boast a far greater resource capacity and use it to support fairly huge pro-
jects (worth a total of some Rb 1bn each); 
3) the actual launch of the institutions in question suffered from substantial delays account-
ing from one to several years. That said, while in the case of RVC and ROSNANO the delay 
was basically a technical one (dictated by the need to shape up management bodies, craft their 
mandates, adopt of corporate regulations and statutes, organize of tenders, etc.), in the case of 
the Venture Investment Fund and the Russian Investment Fund for ICT1 delays were caused 
by substantial deficiencies built in the respective rules and standards;  
4) in a number of cases, while creating new institutions, the performance record (including 
the negative one) of earlier created instruments was taken into account: thus, created by the 
same model as the Venture Investment Fund (that is, a public “fund of funds”), RVC does not 
exhibit the latter’s fundamental normative defects; 
5) Roughly since late 2009 there started a large-scale process of “secondary” creation of 
development institutions. In the frame of the process, the existing structures found new ones, 
with the government initiating the process just in a handful of instances (RFSI, EXIAR). 
Meanwhile, in other cases those were the development institutions’ initiatives, with RVC and 
ROSNANO being particular active in this regard; 
6) The period between 2010 and 2011 saw the rise of the trend to a rapid expansion of the 
national development institutions’ operations: not only has their circle been growing, but di-
rections of their functional profiles and instruments employed expanded, and the volume of 
their resources and the number of innovation projects they support was on the rise.  
The financial institutions established by today appear fairly versatile (see Table 16): they 
focus on support of both small-and medium-sized firms and large corporations’ innovation 
activity; they orient to different phases of a company’s development (from the seed and initial 
ones to maturity), and their mechanisms of support are associated with awarding grants, in-
vestment, disbursement of loans and guarantees. Let us note that different models of encour-
agement of innovation are realized under individual functional directions: thus, in addition to 
grant-based mechanism (the Fund of Assistance to Innovation), seed projects are supported 
through a seed investment vehicle (The Seed Investment Fund under RVC); support to ven-
ture investments is carried out via both the “fund-of-funds” model (RVC and, to a lesser ex-
                                                 
1 The institution was established back in 2007, but has not yet started investment activity due to a legislatively 
set strict requirement to reduce the government’s participation in its capital to 51%. 
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tent, ROSNANO) and on the basis of a mechanism of a program-based support of creation of 
regional venture funds.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Process of Creation of Russian Development Institutions 
In general, the system of Russian financial development institutions has undergone a dra-
matic transformation and become far more exuberant vis-à-vis its nascent state in the early 
2000s: it indeed became richer in the proper sense of the word, that is, in terms of aggregate 
volumes of resources under management, and in a figurative sense – in terms of variety of 
types of the institutions in question. Furthermore, over the past two years the government has 
been far more active in extending the development institutions system and, particularly, in 
implementing its earlier designed blueprints.  
Table 16 
Characteristics of Main Existing Financial Development Institutions  
Development institution 
Year of 
incorpora-
tion 
Legal form Participants Modus operandi 
Forms of 
support 
Stages sup-
ported Resources 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Fund for assistance to 
development of small 
forms of entrepreneurship 
in the scientific-technical 
sphere (The Fund for 
assistance to innovation) 
1994 Federal 
public budg-
et institution  
Russian 
Federation 
Funding 
small inno-
vation firms’ 
R&D at the 
expense of 
public funds  
Grants Pre-seed, 
seed 
Budget 
allocations 
in 2010 –  
Rb 3.4bn, 
2011. – 4bn, 
2012 – 4bn 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Russian Venture Com-
pany (RVC) 
2006 Open-end 
joint-stock 
company 
Russian 
Federation 
The state 
fund of 
funds for 
seed, venture 
and direct 
investment  
Investment Seed 
Venture 
Later stages 
As of late 
2010, net 
assets worth 
a total of  
Rb 34.5bn 
The seed Investment 
Fund under RVC 
2009 LLC RVC – 99%; 
Fund for 
assistance to 
innovation – 
1%. 
Investment 
fund for 
early stages 
Investment Seed Authorized 
capital of  
Rb 2bn 
Regional venture funds  2006–2009 Closed-end 
mutual in-
vestment 
funds for 
particularly 
risky (ven-
ture) in-
vestment  
Regional 
funds for 
assistance to 
investment 
to small-
sized enter-
prises in the 
research and 
technical 
sphere 
(funded in 
equal pro-
portion out 
of the fed-
eral and 
regional 
budgets) – 
50%; out-
sider inves-
tors– 50% 
«Classical» 
venture 
funds 
Investment Venture As of early 
2012, the 
aggregate 
volume was 
Rb 9.2bn 
Foundation for Develop-
ment of the New Tech-
nologies Development 
and Commercialization 
Centre (“Skolkovo Foun-
dation” 
2010 Non-for-
profit or-
ganization 
Russian 
Academy of 
Sciences, 
Vneshe-
conombank, 
Fund for 
assistance to 
innovations, 
Bauman 
Technical 
University, 
ROSNANO, 
RVC 
Funding of 
innovation 
projects of 
companies t 
participating 
in the inno-
vation center 
Grants Pre-seed 
Seed 
Venture 
Budget 
allocations 
in 2010 –  
Rb 10.3bn, 
2011. – 
15.5bn,  
2012 – 
27.1bn 
The Russian Investment 
Fund for information and 
communication technolo-
gies (Rosinfocominvest) 
2007 Open-end 
joint-stock 
company 
Russian 
Federation 
Sectoral 
direct in-
vestment 
fund  
Investment As a rule, 
late 
Authorized 
capital –  
Rb 1.45 bn 
Russian Fund for Techno-
logical Development 
(RFTD) 
1992 Federal state 
autonomous 
institution  
Russian 
Federation 
Support of 
R&D on the 
reverse basis  
Loans As a rule, 
late 
n/a 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
ROSNANO 2007 Open-end 
joint-stock 
company 
Russian 
Federation 
Financing of 
innovation 
companies, 
venture and 
investment 
funds  
Investment Creation and 
development 
of produc-
tion 
Net assets as of 
June 2011-  
Rb 61.3bn; 
long-term 
borrowings 
(under state 
guarantees) – 
Rb 43bn; Rus-
sian Federa-
tion’s contribu-
tion to the 
authorized 
capital in 
2011 –  
Rb 47.2bn  
Bank for Development 
and Foreign Economic 
Activity (Vnesheconom-
bank) 
2007* Public cor-
poration 
Russian 
Federation 
State devel-
opment 
bank, in-
cluding 
exercise of 
support of 
investment 
projects  
Loans, in-
vestment, 
guarantees 
As a rule, 
late 
As of late 
2010, assets 
were worth a 
total of  
Rb 1,782.8bn 
The state specialized 
Russian export-import 
bank (Roseximbank) 
1994 Closed-end 
joint-stock 
company 
Vneshe-
conombank 
Specialized 
bank for 
support of 
export 
Loans, guar-
antees 
As a rule, 
late 
Assets as of 
October 
2011 –  
Rb 9.1bn  
Russian Bank for Small 
and Medium Enterprises 
Support (SME Bank) 
1999 Open-end 
joint-stock 
company 
Vneshe-
conombank 
Support to 
SME 
through 
target fi-
nancing of 
regional 
partners 
represented 
by banks 
and infra-
structure 
organiza-
tions  
Loans (incl. 
microfinanc-
ing), leasing, 
investment 
As a rule, 
late 
Operational 
assets as of 
early 2012 - 
Rb 103.9 bn  
Russian Fund for Direct 
Investment (RFDI) 
2011 Open-end 
joint-stock 
company 
Vneshecono
mbank 
Large in-
vestment in 
leading 
domestic 
corporations 
in a propor-
tion equal to 
foreign 
institutional 
investors’  
Investment As a rule, 
late 
Russian 
Federation’s 
target con-
tribution to 
Vneshe-
conom-
bank’s in 
2011 –  
Rb 62.6bn.** 
Russian Agency for Ex-
port Credit and Invest-
ment Insurance (EXIAR) 
2011 Open-end 
joint-stock 
company 
Vnesheco-
nombank 
Insuring 
Russian 
exporters 
and inves-
tors’ busi-
ness and 
;political 
risks  
Insurance – Authorized 
capital –  
Rb 30bn 
* The year of creation of a public corporation by reorganization of the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity of 
the USSR, which had been operating in various forms since 1922. 
** It is planned that within next 5 years the Government will form the Fund’s capital in a volume of USD 10bn.  
Sources: the development institutions’ official web-pages, official reporting, federal acts on the federal budget. 
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6 . 3 . 2 .  T h e  D e v e l o p me n t  I n s t i t u t i o n s ’  O p e r a t i o n a l  O b j e c t i v e s   
a n d  P r i o r i t i e s ,  a n d  C o n d i t i o n s  o f  P r o j e c t s  S u p p o r t  
Whilst considering the totality of objectives developed for public financial development 
institutions (Table 17), it is worthwhile to note that most of them cite assistance to the public 
policy implementation in the respective area as a principal operational profile, while tasks and 
targets that complement it are likewise formulated very broadly. Notably, mission of some 
financial development institution stretches beyond the framework of delivery of solely finan-
cial services and outlines a broader sphere of their operations. This, the Fund for Assistant to 
Innovation is to help attract extrabudgetary investment in the area of small-sized innovation-
based entrepreneurship, while RVC is tasked to deliver technological and consulting assis-
tance to the innovation market agents and bolster the infrastructure supporting innovation 
clusters, as well as professionalism of participants in the innovation ecosystem and encour-
agement of demand for innovation corporations’ produce.  
Objectives of the two largest development institutions, Vnesheconombank and ROSNANO, 
are somewhat nonpareil ones and worth a particular notice. In case of Vnesheconombank, in 
addition to general objectives, targets and tasks for each of its major operational directions 
were set (including support of investment projects) in a very concrete form and with measures 
on their improvement. Meanwhile, ROSNANO’s peculiarity lies in a fairly specific (at least, 
vis-à-vis other institutions) and very ambitious objective, namely, the being first strategy, as 
far as the global markets for nanotechnological projects are concerned.  
Table 17 
Operational Objectives, Tasks and Priorities of Development Instutions 
Develop-
ment institu-
tion 
Objectives Sectoral and/or subject-wise priorities 
1 2 3 
Fund for 
assistance to 
innovation 
Mission: assistance to implementation of the state scientific-technical policy 
and bottom-up research projects, efficient employment of the scientific-
technical capacity and engagement of scientific and technical achievements 
in the production sphere to bolster development of small forms of enter-
prises in the scientific-technical sphere, whose operations imply practical 
introduction (development) of intellectual deliverables, - small-sized inno-
vation entrepreneurship agents, the innovation infrastructure, generation of 
job opportunities for an efficient building on the existing national scientific 
and technical potential . 
Tasks:  
− Implementation of the public policy on development and support of 
small-sized enterprises in the scientific-technical sphere;  
− Delivery of a direct financial, information and other support to small-
sized innovation enterprises which implement projects on development of 
new kinds of science-intensive products and technologies on the basis of 
belonging to them intellectual property; 
− Creation and bolstering of the infrastructure of support of small-sized 
innovation-based entrepreneurship; 
− Assistance to generation of new job opportunities for an efficient build-
ing on the existing national scientific and technical potential; 
− Attraction of extrabudgetary investment in the sphere of small sized 
innovation-based entrepreneurship; 
− Cadres training (including engagement of the youth in innovation 
activities)  
In the frame of the «Start» program: 
• 5 thematic directions:  
− IT;  
− Medicine of the future;  
− Modern materials and technologies of 
their development;  
− New devices and apps;  
− biotechnology;  
• 80 sub-directions. 
In the frame of the «Development» pro-
gram:  
− Sub-program in the energy-saving 
sphere («Energo»);  
− Sub-program in the sphere of diag-
nostics, prevention and treatment of the 
most socially significant diseases 
(«Frama»);  
− Sub-program in the IT sphere («Soft») 
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1 2 3 
Russian 
Venture 
Company  
Mission: ensuring an accelerated unfolding of an efficient and competitive 
on a global scale national innovation system by creating a self-developing 
venture industry in interaction with other development institutions with the 
help of engagement of private venture capital, bolstering innovation-based 
entrepreneurship and technological business expertise and mobilizing hu-
man capital in Russia. 
Purpose: assistance to implementation of the public policy in the sphere of 
development of Russian innovation industry and the innovation market’s 
infrastructure, shaping up a system of Russia’s own venture investment 
industry, creation of infrastructure for the innovation-venture ecosystem and 
encouragement of its expansion, giving a fillip to demand for innovation 
companies, and generation of profits from business operations. 
Strategic objectives for the period through2020.: ensuring an unfolding of 
an independently developing venture industry and innovation-technical 
entrepreneurship. 
Tasks: 
− Integration into global technological chains and support of export of 
innovation products; 
− Attraction of international investment resources in a “cash-and-
expertise” form to fund Russian innovation industry; 
− Improvement of innovation Russian companies’ investment attractive-
ness; assistance to increase in the number and enhancement of the quality of 
technological investors at all stages of the venture investing process; 
− Communication for the Russian market for innovation, technical and 
consulting assistance to innovation market agents particularly by organizing 
workshops, conferences, symposia and roundtables; 
− Bolstering the back-end infrastructure of innovation clusters, compa-
nies at early stages of venture financing and corporations rendering univer-
sal services to innovation firms; 
− Bolstering professionalism of the innovation ecosystem agents, encour-
agement of demand for innovation corporations’ products; promotion of 
innovation-entrepreneurial, scientific-technical and invention, venture in-
vestment activities, in particular, by assisting to creation and advancement 
of professional contests and awards. 
Main tasks for the period through 2020: engagement of private venture 
capital in development of venture entrepreneurship and assistance in crea-
tion of the institutional and sectoral venture infrastructure  
Venture funds with participation of RVC:  
•  Current priority directions of develop-
ment of science, technologies and technics 
of the Russian Federation: 
− Security and countering terrorism; 
− The nanosystem industry; 
− ICT systems; 
− Life sciences; 
− Promising kinds of arms, military and 
special equipment  
− Rational natural management; 
− Transportation and space systems; 
− Energy efficiency, energy saving, 
nuclear energy; 
 
• List of critical technologies of Russian 
Federation (27 titles therein). 
The RVC’s biofund: biotechnological, 
pharmaceutical and medical industries 
The RVC’s 
seed fund 
Tasks:  
− Boosting advancement of the national sector of seed investment under 
the venture financing industry;  
− Boosting a venture partner network for seed investment funds for the 
sake of a maximum engagement of professional managers, experts and 
business angels in the process of creation of new technological companies;  
− Generation of conditions for shaping up an continuous flow of transac-
tions into venture funds, including those established with participation of 
the JSC RVC’s funds; 
− A significant increase in the number and quality of small-sized techno-
logical businesses consequently claiming for receipt of venture investors 
and early-stage funds’ investment  
 
Priority directions of development of 
science, technologies and technics (see 
above); 
The list of critical technologies of Russian 
Federation  
Skolkovo 
Fund 
Shaping up a full cycle of innovation process, including education and 
research, development efforts and commodization of their deliverables  
Priority directions of modernization and 
technological advancement of Russia’s 
economy (“President’s Priorities”): 
− Energy efficiency and energy saving; 
− Nuclear technologies; 
− Space technologies, telecommunica-
tions and navigation systems; 
− Medical technologies; 
− Strategic computer technologies and 
software  
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1 2 3 
Rosinfo-
cominvest 
Purposes:  
− Facilitation of access to financial resources for the most promising Hi-
Tech and rapidly expanding companies of small and medium-sized capitali-
zation in the ICT sphere; 
− Boosting attractiveness of ICT organizations in the eyes of potential 
investors through the Fund’s participation in their authorized capital and 
management; 
− Attraction of domestic and foreign investment to secure production and 
technological cooperation between domestic and foreign enterprises of the 
ICT sector, development of mutually complementary and supplier/consumer 
production; 
− Assistance to bolstering Russian ICT companies’ investment activity 
with respect to attraction of foreign investment in Hi-Tech sectors of Rus-
sia’s economy. 
− Exclusive operational profile: investing assets in objects referenced to 
in the investment declaration (certain kinds and categories of securities, 
cash on bank accounts and deposits) 
 
ICT 
RFTD Purpose: assistance to implementation of the public policy in the sphere of 
scientific, research and technical and innovation activity.  
Object of activity: securing provision of financial support to Russian or-
ganizations implementing scientific, scientific-technical and innovation 
projects, including those in the frame of international research and technical 
cooperation. 
Technological platforms, including, pri-
marily: 
− medicine of the future; 
− bioindustry and bioresources; 
− bioenergy production; 
− innovation laser, optical and opto-
electronic technologies – photonics; 
− environmentally friendly high-
efficiency thermal power; 
− cutting-edge renewable energy tech-
nologies; 
− small-sized distributed energy produc-
tion; 
− metallurgy materials and 
technologies; 
− technological platform for solid min-
erals; 
− carbohydrates production and use; 
− intense processing of carbohydrate 
resources; 
− ocean development; 
− green growth technologies. 
Priority directions of research, technolo-
gies and technics (see above)  
ROSNANO Mission: assistance to implementation of the public policy aiming at having 
Russia joined the group of leading nations in the nanotechnology area.  
Purposes: 
− assistance to implementation of the public policy in the sphere of es-
tablishment and development of the nanoindustry and the respective inno-
vation infrastructure; 
− financing investment nanotechnology production projects; 
− building technological chains securing the rise of new production units 
in the nanoindustry area in the territory of Russian Federation; 
− Generation of profit in the course of implementation of the above pur-
poses. 
Main objective: Russia winning leading positions on global markets for 
nanotechnological products.  
Main purposes: securing commodization of the nanoindustry’s R&D and 
coordination of innovation activities in the sohere of nanoindustry. 
Main vehicle: investment projects 
Nanotechnologies 
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1 2 3 
Vhesheco-
nombank 
Mission: the national development bank, assisting to implementation of the 
public socio-economic policy, bolstering the national economy’s competi-
tiveness and its innovation-based modernization. 
Purpose: securing an increase in competitiveness of the Russian Federa-
tion’s economy, its diversification, encouragement of investment activity by 
exercising investment, foreign economic, insurance, consulting and other 
provided for by law activities with regard to implementation of projects 
both in Russian Federation and overseas, including those with participation 
of foreign capital, aiming at bolstering infrastructure, innovation, special 
economic zones, environment protection, support of export of Russian 
products, works and services, and support of small-and medium-sized en-
trepreneurship. 
Strategic objective for the period through 2015: boosting the activity on 
securing a sustained innovation socio-economic development of Russian 
Federation on the basis of the national economy’s modernization and in-
creasing competitiveness. Implementation of this objective requires a con-
siderable increase in the volume of financing of investment projects, expan-
sion of support of export of Hi-Tech products and implementation of 
support programs for SME, as well as introduction of best practices with 
regard to project development and management. 
The Bank’s contribution to solving the government’s task of the national 
economy modernization requires an increase in its credit portfolio of the 
share of loans associated with the funding of investment projects. 
Strategic objective in the area of contribution to implementation of invest-
ment projects: boosting the volume of financing of investment projects 
across major avenues and sectoral priorities. 
To implement this objective the Bank will need to tackle the following 
tasks:  
− To ensure a greater efficiency of investment projects to implementation 
of which the Bank contributes, including improvement of internal docu-
ments with respect to project evaluation and selection;  
− To improve the system of control over implementation of investment 
projects (including, inter alia, with respect to financial monitoring, monitor-
ing of progress in projects implementation and their efficiency);  
− To render assistance to organizations in preparation of project docu-
mentation in accordance with the Bank’s requirements; 
− To create private equity funds and specialized sectoral investment 
funds to attract the domestic and foreign capital; 
− To expand the range of instruments of the Bank’s contribution to im-
plementation of investment projects by creating development corporations 
and funds 
Sectoral priorities: 
− aircraft engineering and aerospace 
complex; 
− ship-building; 
− electronics industry; 
− nuclear sector, including nuclear 
energy; 
− transport, special and power machine 
building; 
− metallurgy (production of special 
kinds of steel); 
− wood-working industry; 
− defense-industrial complex; 
− agroindustrial complex; 
− strategic computing technologies and 
software; 
−  ICT; 
− Medical technics and pharmaceutical 
sector. 
Priority directions of modernization and 
technological advancement of Russia’s 
economy (the “Presidential priorities”, see 
above) 
Roseximbank Purpose: implementation of the public policy of supporting and encourag-
ing the national export, creation of import-substituting production and assis-
tance in attraction of investment into Russia’s economy. 
In its capacity of an agent of the RF Government with regard to extension 
of the state financial support to Russian exports the Bank is responsible for 
the following tasks: 
Pursuance of the state policy in the area of guarantee-based support of Rus-
sian exports oriented towards solidification of Russian exporters’ standing 
competition-wise on traditional markets of developing and the CIS coun-
tries; 
Rendering assistance to Russian exporters with regard to marketing their 
industrial products; 
Granting Russian exporters access to long-term loans, including pre-export 
lending at minimal market rates. 
The Bank’s operation as the RF Government’s agent with regard to state 
support of exports should help:  
− Boost the number of national exporters and countries wherein their 
supply their products;  
− Promote Russian companies’ competitiveness on the global market;  
− Create import-substituting production units, including innovation ones;  
− Attraction of investment in Russia’s economy;  
- Generation job opportunities in the country 
 
The manufacturing sector 
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1 2 3 
SME Bank Strategic objective in the area of support of SME: expansion of the financial 
support of development of SME agents for the sake of diversification of the 
economy’s structure, increase in employment, bolstering self-employment 
growth in GDP, boosting tax revenues, emergence of the middle class. 
Tasks in the area of support of SME:  
− Ensuring equal opportunities to small- and medium-sized businesses to 
medium- and long term financial resources throughout the territory of Rus-
sian Federation, including resource-scarce regions in the first place; 
− Organization of financial support to production corporations in the first 
place, as well as those implementing innovation and Hi-Tech projects, thus 
promoting changes in the sectoral structure of the lending; 
− Funding development of the support infrastructure for small-and me-
dium-sized businesses (microlenders, business incubators, leasing compa-
nies, regional funds of support of MSE, technoparks, multifunctional busi-
ness centers for MSEs, etc.) 
Primarily production sector  
RFDI Mission, values: 
− Maximization of return on investment to secure a greater corporations’ 
efficiency, generation of job opportunities and promotion of the economy’s 
competitiveness; 
− Assistance in modernization of Russian economy; 
− Ensuring the foreign investment inflow; 
− Ensuring the inflow of the most advanced technologies and the best 
cadres into Russia; 
− Ensuring transparency of the corporate governance procedures 
Fundamental sectors of modernization: 
− Advanced processing of mineral 
resources; 
− Technological development of critical 
deposits; 
− Agriculture and food retail; 
− House construction and construction 
materials; 
− Transport and logistics. 
Priority directions of modernization and 
technological development of Russia’s 
economy («Presidential priorities», see 
above) 
EXIAR Objective: support of national exports and investment outside of Russia 
across the following directions: 
− Insuring of export loans from entrepreneurial (business) and political 
risks; 
− Insuring Russian investments to overseas from political risks. 
Tasks: 
− Marketing Russian export of equipment and technologies; 
− Monitoring and insurance support of national exporters on new and 
risky markets overseas; 
− Design and introduction of a modern system of financial support of 
export under the Agency’s insurance coverage; 
− Increase in transparency of Russian export transactions and interna-
tional investment 
 
– 
Sources: statutory and other title documents, including development institutions’ internal documents, approved 
strategies and development programs, the development institutions’ official homepages. 
The development institutions’ current operational priorities appear fairly versatile, having 
different nature and “origin” and, generally speaking, they raise some questions. More spe-
cifically, in accordance with the statute on investment policy of the Russian Venture Com-
pany, venture funds in which creation it participates and the Fund for Seed Investment should 
follow in their operations officially set priority directions of development of research, tech-
nologies and technics, and the list of critical technologies of Russian Federation; investments 
made by Skolkovo Foundation should be consistent the with priority directions of moderniza-
tion and technological development set by the RF President; the “Start” program operated by 
the Fund for Assistance to Innovation provides for technological “framework” (a fairly big 
one, apropos) set by the Fund itself. That said, there are serious doubts about appropriateness 
of employment of any priorities and restrictions at the stage of seed – and even more so – pre-
seed financing. 
At this point, it is worth noting a fairly peculiar prioritization scheme devised by the Rus-
sian Fund for Technological Development. The Fund focuses on support of projects matching 
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respective approved technological platforms and, primarily, those related to technologies of 
live systems, future energy engineering and rational environmental management. Venshe-
conombank centers on sectoral priorities which encompass practically all major manufactur-
ing industries. Meanwhile, it is only one of them, namely, metallurgy for which a priority was 
identified, that is, a relatively narrow segment of special steel production, with no meticu-
lously identified priorities for the other sectors. Lastly, a range of development institutions 
have a clear technological specialization (ROSNANO- nanoindustry, Rosinfocominvest – 
ICT, RVC’s Biofund – bioindustry and pharmaceuticals), but it is not clear why other Hi-
Tech sectors have thus far been neglected in this respect. 
In all, the current system of development institutions’ priorities cannot be viewed as a suf-
ficiently consistent. Quite opposite, it appears even “spontaneous”, with no general layout or 
ideology underpinning it. 
While considering the current requirements to quantitative parameters of supported com-
panies and projects (Table 18) it should be noted a drawback of the current development insti-
tutions system, as follows: it does not appear to a sufficient degree oriented toward supporting 
mid-size projects worth in the region between several hundred million and one billion Rubles. 
It is only ROSNANO which can afford to support such projects (provided they are directly 
associated with the nanotechnology sphere), and so can some of RVC’s venture funds. As to 
other development institutions, they center on either bigger, or smaller projects. The SME 
Bank’s operations nominally focus on small- and medium-sized businesses, but due to the ef-
fective caps on volume of funding (Rb 150mn for innovation and modernization projects and 
Rb 60mn – for all other projects), they largely center on support of small-sized businesses. 
Table 18 
Main Parameters of and Restrictions on the Development Institutions’ Operations  
on Support of Innovation Companies and Projects1 
Characteristics of supported companies Characteristics of supported projects 
Development 
institutions 
Forms of 
support «Age», as 
yearsa 
Number of 
employeesa 
Volume of 
revenues 
(income) as 
Rb mnа 
Volume of 
support, as 
Rb mn 
Term of 
support, 
years 
Co-
financing, as 
% 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Fund for assis-
tance to innnova-
tion (“Start” 
program) 
Grants Up to 2 No more than 
100 
Up to 0.3 Year I – up to 
1; 
Year II – up 
to 2; 
Year III – up 
to 3  
1–3 Year I – 0; 
Year II – no 
less than 50; 
Year III – no 
less than 50 
RVC’s Fund of 
Seed Investment 
Investment No more  
than 3 
 No more  
than 10  
Up to 25 1–5  No less than 
25 
Skolkovo Foun-
dation 
Grants    1,5–300 Up to 10b 0–75 
Regional venture 
funds 
Investment  Up to 250 Up to 1000  Up to 36–
120c 
Up to 7d 25–75 
RVC’s Venture 
funds 
Investment   No more  
than 75  
Up to 300–
1000 
Up to 5–10  
RVC’s biofund Investment    No more than 
100e 
 No less than 
50 
                                                 
1 In this case we do not consider support of infrastructure, educational, etc. projects  
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Russian Fund for 
Technological 
Development 
Credits    As a rule, no 
more than 
300 
Up to 5  
Rosinfocominvest Investment    No more than 
150 
2–6  No less than 
50 
ROSNANO Investment   No less than 
250f 
300–1300 No more than 
10 
No less than 
25–50 
Loans  Up to 250 Up to 1,000  Up to 60; 
microfinanc-
ing – between 
0.1 and 1 per 
contract (no 
more than 10 
by all the 
contract with 
a given SME 
agent); 
funding for 
innovation 
and moderni-
zation – up to 
150 
From 0,5 Up 
to 5; 
Microfinanc-
ing – from 
0,25 Up to 2; 
Financing of 
innovationas 
and moderni-
zation – from 
1 Up to 5–7g 
0 or no less 
than 15g 
Leasing No less than 1 Up to 250 Up to 1,000  Between 
0.15–60 up to 
60–150b 
Up to 5 No less than 
15–30g 
 
Investment  Up to 250 Up to 1,000  Up to 60 5–7 No less than 
15h 
Vnesheconom-
bank 
Loans    No less than 
1000 (the 
volume of the 
project – no 
less than 
2,000) 
As a rule, more 
than 3 (pay-
back time - 
over 5) 
No less than 
20 
Russian Fund for 
Direct Investment 
Investment    1500–15,000i  No less than 
50 
Note.  
a – as of the moment of the beginning of support; 
b – the term of effect of the status of participant in the Innovation Center Skolkovo; 
c – due to the volume of the Fund; 
d – the term of trust of the funds; 
e – during the first round of investment; 
f – in 5 years after the start of the project; 
g – due to conditions of a concrete direction of support (product); 
h – from the total value of the project; investment – no more than 25% of the total value, credit support – no 
more than 60%; 
i – 50–500 $ mn. 
There exist some barriers to the “innovation lift” at early stages, particularly to the “cap-
ture” by the RVC’s Seed Investment Fund of successful projects earlier supported by the 
Fund for Assistance to Innovation. This can be explained by the fact that the Seed Investment 
Fund grants support on a far greater (up to Rb 25mn) level, and the recipient company should 
be no more than 3-year old. By contrast, the Fund for Assistance to Innovation extends sup-
port to companies aged under 2 years and with the volume of proceeds at the onset of no more 
than Rb 0.3mn. So, objectively, companies’ chances for managing to “grow up” to a level at 
which they can qualify for the Seed Investment Fund’s support are limited. 
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Fig. 2. “Positioning” of Financial Development Institutions by Stages of Projects  
and Volumes of Their Support  
It should be noted that there has recently emerged a tendency to extension of the upper 
margin of support: thus, the Fund for Assistance to Innovation raised it by 1/3, SME Bank 
now is in a position to disburse loans of up to Rb 150mn to innovation and modernization 
projects (with another 60mn to be potentially invested in SME implementing such projects), 
while earlier the cap for the said categories of project was Rb 60mn. Plus, some of recently 
established institutions and funds allow far greater projects financing volumes than the exist-
ing institutions centering on the same stages of the innovation cycle (the most shining exam-
ples in this respect are Skolkovo and RFDI). 
6 . 3 . 3 .  A s s e s s me n t  o f  t h e  S c a l e  a n d  O u t p u t s  o f  t h e  D e v e l o p me n t   
I n s t i t u t i o n s ’  P e r fo r ma n c e ,  M a i n  T e n d e n c i e s   
a n d  R e c e n t  C r i t i c a l  C h a n g e s   
The number of supported projects recently has steadily been on the upsurge (Fig. 3), and in 
2009 – 2010 it nearly tripled, which can be ascribed largely to a substantial expansion of SME 
Bank’s operations. The rise was practically exclusively fueled by projects at late stages of the 
innovation cycle, which resulted in a very considerable “bias” towards those: while in 2004 
the number of supported projects at early stages roughly equaled the one of late-stage pro-
jects, in 2010 the latter accounted for nearly 90%. 
The prevalence of late-stage projects is yet more visible in the structure of financing (Fig. 4), 
which, however, is quite natural, as the size of support granted at early stages is more humble. 
As well, let us note that in the overwhelming majority of cases the size of support of projects 
implemented in 2010 was fairly small and accounted for up to Rb 50mn per project. 
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* Hereinafter without regard of the projects supported by SME Bank via the infrastructure organizations. 
Source: estimates by the interdepartmental Analytical Center on the basis of materials of Russian development 
institutions and RVCI. 
Fig. 3. Dynamic of the Number of Supported by Development Institutions  
Projects by Main Stages of Innovation Cycle* 
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Source: estimates by the interdepartmental Analytical Center on the basis of materials of Russian development 
institutions and RVCI. 
Fig. 4. Volume of Financing of Supported during the Year Projects by Development  
Institutions by Main Stages of Innovation Cycle 
It was the Fund for Assistance to Investment and SME Bank’s performance which proved 
the most “mass-scale” one (Fig. 5): in the case of the former institution, there were hundreds 
of objects of support over the year, while in the latter case they were counted in thousands. 
Common for the institutions in question is their focus on support of relatively small projects: 
in the former case the grant typically does not exceed Rb 1mn, while loans disbursed in the 
latter case account for some Rb 4mn each. That said, the institutions’ operations center on the 
“polar” stages of the innovation cycle: that is to say, the Fund supports projects at their early 
(mostly pre-seed) stages, while the Bank does the same for projects on late stages. 
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Source: estimates by the interdepartmental Analytical Center on the basis of materials of Russian development 
institutions and RVCI. 
Fig. 5. The Number of Projects Supported by Development Institutions over the Year 
When it comes to the performance of two particular development institutions, SME Bank 
and Vnesheconombank, which carry out fairly large-scale support programs (in the former 
case – in terms of the number of supported objects, while in the latter case – volume-wise), 
their common peculiarity lies in a relatively low proportion of the “investment component”: 
thus, the institutions themselves estimate the specific weight of innovation projects in the 
overall amount of support at the level of ¼ for SME Bank (as of 2009) and a meager 3% for 
Vnesheconombank (as of 2010). Meanwhile, SME Bank has recently launched a program 
“Financing of innovation and modernization” which should intensify its activity in the area of 
innovation; as to Vnesheconombank, we feel the above estimate appears lower than in reality, 
as some projects which the Bank did not label as innovation ones are directly associated with 
innovation, nevertheless. As well, it is worth noting that the Bank’s recently adopted strategy 
through 2015 provides for an increase of the proportion of investment projects in its credit 
portfolio up to 20%. 
While comparing the magnitude of the development institutions’ operations in 2008 with 
the 2010–2011 one (Table 19), it is worthwhile to note their substantial expansion for most of 
the institutions and, sometimes, in tandem with diversification of their activities. In a number 
of cases that was determined by the fact that back in 2008 some institutions (like RVC or 
ROSNANO) basically kicked off into existence and were way below their “projected capac-
ity”. However, in certain instances, it can be ascertained that already mature institutions (such 
as SME Bank) expanded their operations considerably. Against the general backdrop RFTD 
appears a notable looser, as not only did the Fund fail to expand its R&D financing opera-
tions, but de facto put them on halt. That said, as noted above, it was announced in 2011 that 
the Fund was going to renew its operations in the capacity of development institution. 
Table 19 
Magnitude and Performance of Development Institutions with Regard  
to Support of Innovation Projects  
Magnitude and performance Development institu-
tions 2008 2010–2011 
1 2 3 
Fund for Assistance to 
Innovation  
Between 2004 and 2008 in the frame of the “Start” 
program 8,700 applications were considered, over 
2,000 projects were supported, including some 270 
ones – at the second stage and around 50 – at the third 
stage 
By late 2010 in the frame of the “Start” program over 
12,000 applications had been received and some 
3,000 projects were supported. As many as 82 small-
sized innovation companies had completed a three-
stage cycle of the program  
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1 2 3 
Russian Venture Com-
pany 
As many as 7 venture funds with a total volume of a. 
Rb 19bn were formed. Three funds invested some Rb. 
1.8bn in 15 companies 
By late 2011 venture funds had selected 45 projects to 
be financed. The Seed Investment Fund was created 
(see below). Two Funds were created under foreign 
jurisdictions and USD 20mn was invested. The 
RVC’s InfraFund was established , 9 projects were 
selected. The RVC’s BioFund was established 
RVC’s Seed Investment 
Fund 
– By the end of 2011 41 projects were selected  for 
financing 
Regional venture funds As many as 14 funds created in 12 Russian regions 
with a total capitalization of some Rb 5.5bn. A. 30 
porjects were funded, and the aggregate amount of 
investment hit Rb 1.3bn  
There are 22 funds in 20 regions with the aggregate 
capitalization of over Rb 9bn. By late 2010 they had 
approved a. 50 projects for financing, and the aggre-
gate amount of investment was Rb. 3.3bn   
Skolkovo Foundation – By late 2011 as many as 85 grants worth a total of Rb 
5.8bn were approved and the volume of co-financing 
hit Rb 4bn. The grant recipients de facto received 
Rb 1.9bn  
Russian Fund for Tech-
nological Development 
Over 800 projects worth a total of Rb 7.4bn were financed* 
ROSNANO By late 2008 a. 400 applications and proposals for 
financing were received for a total of Rb. 464bn, 
including 310bn out of the corporation’s funds. ROS-
NANO approved 7 projects (6 investment and 1 edu-
cational one) worth a total of Rb. 10.3bn, including 
5.5bn – out for the Corporation’s funds. Another 2 
projects were launched with the funding amounting to 
Rb 0.2bn 
By late 2011 as many as 1,884 applications for project 
financing worth a total of Rb 4,064bn, including 
1,764bn out of the Corporation’s funds (in 2010 – 439 
applications, Rb 1,867bn and 556bn, respectively). Of 
the said number 104 projects worth a total of Rb 
347bn, including ROSNANO’s co-funding in the 
amount of Rb 140bn, were approved (in 2010 – 44 
projects, Rb 146bn and 47bn, respectively). The Cor-
poration allocated Rb 64bn for 49 projects, includ-
ing32bn – in 2010. ROSNANO fulfilled its invest-
ment obligations by 11 projects. ROSNANO’s 
participation with Rb 30bn in creation of 8 venture 
funds worth a total of Rb 62bnwas approved. Of the 
said number 4 funds were financed (Skolkovo-
Nanotech, Advanced Nanotechnologies, Nanomet, 
Rosnano Capital), of which 3 are up and running 
Vnesheconombank By late 2008 as a creditor contributed to financing of 
54 investment projects, of which contributed to 5 
projects as an investor, too, while to another two 
projects – as a guarantor. The volume of loans on 
implementation of investment projects accounted for 
Rb 129.9bn. In 2008, the Bank started financing 21 
new investment projects in Russia 
By late 2010 Vnesheconombank contributed to fund-
ing of 97 investment projects, of which to 94 – as a 
creditor. As well, the Bank provided guarantees to 2 
investment projects. The volume of disbursed loans 
accounted for Rb 306bn, the balance-sheet value of 
stock the Bank acquired in the process of allocation of 
support to the project was Rb 27bn, and the volume of 
guarantees provided was a. Rb 11bn. In 2010 the 
Bank began financing 27 new investment projects and 
disbursed Rb 126bn in loans on projects implementa-
tion, including Rb 61bn- on new projects, and in-
vested in corporate stock over Rb 20bn 
Roseximbank By late 2008, the Bank’s credit portfolio accounted 
for Rb 4bn, including some 2.5bn extended in the 
form of pre-export funding. The volume of loans 
disbursed in 2008 was Rb. 29bn 
By late 2010, the Bank’s credit portfolio accounted 
for Rb. 5.1bn, including some 3bn extended in the 
form of pre-export and investment lending (aiming, as 
a rule, at modernization of equipment of manufactur-
ing corporations seeking to reduce production costs of 
their exports). In the course of the year, Rb 3.7bn was 
disbursed (prolonged) in loans 
SME Bank In 2008, as many as 1,600 loans worth a a total of Rb. 
7.8bn were disbursed to SMEs.  
In all, since 2004, the Bank extended nearly 6,500 
loans to SMEs for a total of over Rb 23bn 
In 2010, MSEs were granted some 5,000 loans for a 
total of over Rb 27bn. By the end of the year, the 
aggregate volume of the support to SMEs accounted 
for, on an accrual basis, some Rb 80bn. In the frame 
of the “Financing for innovation and modernization” 
program in 2010 alone the Bank disbursed 12 loans 
for a total of Rb. 0.8bn  
* By 2008 RFTD had de facto terminated its project financing operations.  
Sources: the official corporate reports, the development institutions’ official homepages.  
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Importantly, a number of Russian development institutions have lately substantially modi-
fied operations (or, at least, modifications began to emerge therein), and, as a rule, for the 
better: 
• As the most visible recent tendency it is worth noticing the aforementioned activation of 
efforts to complete building the system of development institutions, primarily in respect to 
creation of new ones both by the state (Skolkovo Foundation) and by the already existing 
institutions (RVC and ROSNANO’s venture and infrastructure funds, among others – see 
Fig. 6); 
• The processes of Russian development institutions’ integration into the global innovation 
system have gained a notable momentum: at this point, it would be appropriate to cite a 
string of programs with Vnesheconombank’s participation (co-funding of projects in the 
area of infrastructure, industrial production, energy efficiency and resource management 
with the World Bank; a joint program with EBRD on funding investment projects in the 
frame of the Russia-EU “Partnership for Modernization” initiative, and incorporation by 
RVC and ROSNANO of subsidiaries and foundations under foreign jurisdictions;  
• An important operational direction for the institutions and funds in question has recently 
been support of development of various elements of the innovation operational (informa-
tion, educational one, etc.) infrastructure. At this point, it should be noted that while crea-
tion by ROSNANO of the Fund for Infrastructure and Educational Programs allows to 
speak about incorporation of the respective operational direction in the individual legal en-
tity format, creation, for instance, of the InfraFund and BioFund under RVC (in the focus of 
the latter are both innovation and service companies that deliver laboratory, information-
analytical and consulting services) constitutes the every initiation of the respective opera-
tional directions under the aegis of Russian Venture Company; 
• Meanwhile, the development institutions have substantially bolstered their cooperation with 
respect to support of innovation activities. The most visible manifestations of the process in 
question are the “Agreement of the Nine” aiming at securing a perpetual funding of innova-
tion projects1; bilateral agreements between individual funds and institutions, such as crea-
tion of the RVC’s Seed Investment Fund with participation of the Fund for Assistance to 
Innovation, the RVC running evaluation of projects that seek funding out of regional ven-
ture funds. Besides, it is worthwhile to note the recently started “mutual penetration” of 
managing structures of different development institutions, which is most visible at the level 
of their Boards (Advisory Councils);  
• The search for optimal forms of organization of development institutions’ operations, shap-
ing up new directions and instruments of support, including in pursuit of strategic pros-
pects, is under way. To cite particular moves or core initiatives in this area suffice it to refer 
to the incorporation of ROSNANO and the planned for a foreseeable future privatization of 
a fraction (up to 10%) of the newly established joint-stock company’s stock; the transfor-
mation of RFTD from public institution into an autonomous one and renewal of its opera-
tions on supporting R&D with the emphasis on projects implemented in the frame of tech-
                                                 
1 In 2010, a number of public development institutions, including Vnesheconombank, ROSNANO, the RF Min-
istry of Education, Fund for Assistance to Innovation and RVC, as well as 2 non-profits (OPORA Rossii and the 
Russian Association fof Direct and Venture Investment), and MICEX, and the Federal Agency for Youth con-
cluded a cooperation agreement which provides for organization of a prompt information exchange about pro-
jects in progress to arrange for their “transfer” from one institution to another.    
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nological platforms; the already repetitiously cited creation of RVC and ROSNANO’s 
funds; initiation by the Russian Bank for Development of the “Financing for Innovation 
and Modernization” program. It is also worth noting a practically completed process of de-
velopment of strategic guidelines (plans, programs, etc.) for core institutions for years to 
come1; 
• Development institutions have to some degree succeeded in solidifying trust in them 
through their leadership’s professional reputation. In this regard the most shining example 
is the composition of the RVC’s Board, with 3 out of its 7 members being independent di-
rectors and renowned business community representatives.  
 
 
Fig. 6. The System of Existing Financial Development Institutions  
and the Ones under Development  
While considering the balance of the development institutions’ strengths and weaknesses 
(Table 20) it can be noticed that each of them is in possession of a substantial spare capacity 
to bolster operations on support of innovation: for example, the Fund for Assistance to Inno-
vation could raise its caps on both the volume of support and the size of supported companies, 
as well as enhance its operational transparency and improve the overall performance; Vne-
sheconombank could bolster the innovation component; Rosinfocominvest could tackle nor-
                                                 
1 The only clear “lacuna” today is the absence of such a public document for the Fund of Assistance to Innova-
tion; however, it has already crafted a draft medium-term action plan.  
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mative hurdles to the start of its investment operation; and practically all the institutions could 
expand the array of forms of support and intensify their efforts to attract private resources. 
Table 20 
Main Strengths and Weaknesses of Development Institutions  
with Respect to Support of Innovation  
Strengths Weaknesses 
1 2 3 
Fund for Assistance to Inno-
vation 
Implements a grant-based scheme of support, no problems 
with “walking out” from the supported projects. 
A developed territorial structure in place, a broad “encom-
passing” of Russian regions, a well-developed evaluation 
system. 
Credibility, the possibility for a substantial scaling of 
“Start” and “SMART” programs without lowering the 
selection quality bar.  
Flexibility and creativity in shaping up new programs. 
Possibility for building a program of new directions of 
support, particularly with regard to small business – export-
ers 
Financial resources are limited. 
A significant fraction of programs suspended during the 
crisis. 
The Fund’s support may go only into funding R&D and 
works directly related to R&D implementation.  
A fairly low cap on support of a single project. 
Restrictions on subjects of supported projects (albeit not 
so stringent) appear excessive on the seed stage and on 
the pre-seed one in particular.  
Possibilities for purchasing special equipment are consid-
erably restricted by the effective standards1, ergo, prob-
lems with supporting start-ups where costly equipment is 
needed.  
No approved development strategy and public perform-
ance reports available 
RVC Possibilities for flexible participation in creation of various 
funds together with private businesses.  
RVC’s lessen principle with regard to decisions on projects 
selection generate general framework for private initiative 
and risk allocation.  
In addition to “typical” venture funds, shaping up special-
ized ones (seed, infrastructure, sectoral (BioFund). 
High activity, regular putting forward new practical initia-
tives on creation of new funds, development of the innova-
tion-venture ecosystem, etc.  
Shift of the focus on creation of funds without co-
sponsors. 
Due to the established prioritization (priority directions of 
development of research, technologies and technics, and 
the list of critical technologies of RF) there may exist a 
lack of attention to interdisciplinary projects, new, rapidly 
growing sectors that have failed to make it into the list of 
officially set priorities 
RVC’s Seed Investment Fund With account of a substantially higher (compared with the 
‘Start” program) cap on support of a individual project –s 
the possibility for implementation of investment-intensive 
projects at the seed stage across a broad spectrum of the-
matic directions. 
No caps on kinds of financial costs associated with projects 
implementation, flexible conditions with regard to projects 
implementation timelines. 
Focus on capitalization of innovation firms.  
Possibility for creation in the future of a steady flow of 
transactions on “walkaway” from projects with the help of 
the system of venture partners 
Overly strict capping on marginal earnings of a company 
potentially applying for support – in reality it is micro-
companies, not even small-sized businesses which are 
subject to support. 
Due to the innovation pattern of the “seeding”, the prob-
lem of “walkaway” from projects. 
Requirement to supported companies’ operations to be in 
line with priority directions of development of research, 
technologies and technics, and the list of critical tech-
nologies of RF appears excessive 
Regional venture funds Attraction of RF Subjects’ funds to develop the venture 
industry. 
A due account of the regional specificity of venture invest-
ment, possibility for flexible “walkaway” timelines. 
Decreasing small-sized innovation companies’ costs of 
access to support  
Requirement for RVC to run evaluation of projects seeking 
the funds’ investment can positively influence the quality of 
supported projects 
Low level of investment activity: as of late 2010 the 
average transactions-to-fund ratio was just around 2 to 1.  
The need for an “intermediary link” – The need for «re-
gional funds for assistance to venture investment in 
small-sized enterprises in the technical sphere most of 
which are used to create a sole venture fund.  
A broad representation of RVC on the funds’ Boards in 
tuned, with evaluation of projects can result in an exces-
sive concentration of real control powers in the hands of 
RVC. 
Negative record of interaction with private management 
companies (in Tyumen oblast, Stavropol krai). 
An insufficient level of the overall transparency of the 
system of created funds and their deliverables 
Skolkovo Foundation Considerable amount of support, grant-based operational 
pattern. 
Possibility to combine financial support with other mecha-
nisms provided for residents of the Skolkovo Innovation 
Center: large-scale tax, customs and tariff benefits, a simpli-
fied procedure of employment of foreign workforce, soften-
ing administrative barriers to doing business with the use of 
an independent institutional regulation system  
The priorities embrace just a fraction of promising direc-
tions of technological development.  
The current concept of the Foundation and the Innovation 
Center is better suited to accommodate large, well-
established companies, rather than innovation startups 
 
                                                 
1 Proportion of funds used to purchase special equipment may not exceed 15% of the value of the contract . 
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1 2 3 
Rosinfocominvest Focus on a partial privatization, possibility to refine the 
scheme of attraction of private investment at the Fund’s 
level which can prove effective in the ICT sector, along 
with implementation of a broad totality in respect of short-
term projects 
Ban on the Fund investing until the moment the govern-
ment reduces participation in its capital to 51%, the 
absence of any progress in attraction of private share-
holders and, as a consequence, the absence of the Fund’s 
profile operations. 
The cap on investment in a given single project may 
prove insufficient, as the Fund has not right to invest in 
LLCs of which such a volume of investment is more 
typical than of JSCs  
RFTD A significant record of selection and support of applied 
research projects.  
A mature system of communication with research organiza-
tions and corporations.  
As the focus is on support of projects in the frame of tech-
nological platforms, the high demand for the projects’ 
outputs is highly likely 
Just a sole mechanism of support is permitted, that is, 
target loans, which is not always the best mechanism for 
innovation projects by companies and new and small-
sized ones in particular.  
The selection of a fraction of technological platforms as 
top priority ones is not clear 
ROSNANO Holistic approach to operations (support of innovation 
projects, innovation infrastructure development, education, 
improvement of regulation. 
Sizeable financial resources at hands. 
Upon incorporation there emerges a possibility (and plans 
have been shaped up already) for attraction of private 
investors. 
Highly active, primarily in regard to investment projects 
rollout across a broad range of directions. 
A considerable number of initiatives associated with the 
innovation infrastructure development. 
A fairly high degree of transparency, including that of 
operational pillars and regulations; a well-developed public 
awareness and communications system.  
Gradual drift to support of increasingly larger programs 
and projects.  
With no strictly established corporate development 
framework in place, the risk of an unjustified expansion 
of the scale and functions. 
The de-facto refusal to finance R&D (beyond the frame 
of innovation projects), while support of R&D was set as 
one of the company’s major functions 
Vnesheconombank A sizeable resources volume, possibility to support huge 
long-term investment projects. 
Pre-crisis, a high efficacy with regard to organization of 
selection and support of implementation of huge investment 
projects. 
The resource and organizational capacity on hand to sup-
port projects that secure significant multiplying effects for 
advancement of the national economy and the rise of pro-
gressive technological shifts.  
Rainbow of forms of support: loans, investment,  
guarantees – and the possibility to combine them. 
Possibility to expand projects on support of regional inno-
vation infrastructure 
No strictly determined methodology of assessment and 
principles of support of investment projects on develop-
ment of innovation as yet. 
A gradual expansion of the Bank’s functions in its capac-
ity of the RF Government’s agent (which became particu-
larly significant during the crisis) which reduces the 
Bank’s capacity with regard to a consistent and systemic 
implementation of functions of development institution.  
There are signs of a certain trend to reallocation of re-
sources in favor of infrastructure projects with resources 
on support of innovation projects being limited.  
No strictly determined requirements to the extrabudgetary 
project co-financing. 
The risk of using the Bank’s resources as a “surrogate” of 
extrabudgetary funding in side-projects (including those 
implemented by other development institutions) 
Roseximbank Employment of various schemes, provision of support at 
different stages, including the pre-export one. 
Support of export as a major profile, a substantial record in 
this sphere 
Relatively moderate magnitude of operations and humble 
resource capacity on hand.  
A certain inclination to supporting traditional industries. 
The support was not customized to meet small-sized 
companies’ needs 
SME Bank  Well-developed and fairly effective operational pattern of a 
mass provision of support to SMEs on the basis of agent 
agreements with banks and infrastructure organizations. 
Sizeable volume of resources to support SMEs. 
A very broad “encompassing” (in terms of the number of 
supported projects). 
Rainbow of forms of support: loans, including microfinanc-
ing), leasing, investment. 
Expansion of the scope and employment of new forms of 
support, in particular, in the innovation sphere  
Because of the effective caps on loans, the Bank focuses 
largely on support of small-sized and micro-firms, rather 
than medium-sized businesses.  
A special program of support of innovation activity was 
launched just in 2010 and, funds-wise, has thus far been 
fairly modest 
RFDI Possibility to implement very large, backbone for an indus-
try, region or the economy as a whole, projects  
Focus on attraction of foreign investors, including institu-
tional ones. 
Intention to invest in rapidly expanding sectors and industry 
leaders  
Taking into account prospective projects – relatively 
small capital of the fund. 
No publicly available documents to specify the procedure 
and conditions of investment activity.  
The risk of “megalomania” in the course of selection of 
projects to  
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6 . 3 . 4 .  C r i t i c a l  C h a l l e n g e s  a n d  P o s s i b l e  Wa y s  o f  I mp r o v e me n t   
o f  t h e  S y s t e m o f  P u b l i c  F i n a n c i a l  D e v e l o p me n t  I n s t i t u t i o n s   
w i t h  R e g a r d  t o  S u p p o r t  o f  I n n o v a t i o n  A c t i v i t y   
So, there has recently emerged a tendency to a notable expansion of Russian financial de-
velopment institutions’ scope of operations: the volume of their investment is on the rise, as 
the number of investment projects they back is. Our estimates suggest that the aggregate vol-
ume of support of investment and innovation projects by development institutions increased 
from Rb 78bn in 2008 to 211bn in 2010, while the number of supported projects grew over 
the same period from 2,100 to 5,800. As noted above, it was expansion of the Russian Bank 
for Development’s operations on support of MSEs that accounted for a critical contribution to 
the rise in the number of supported projects. Meanwhile, the growth in the overall volume of 
support was secured by expansion of the Vnesheconombank’s operations on lending to in-
vestment projects and ROSNANO’s funding production projects. 
In its most general form, as far as the innovation sphere is concerned, the development in-
stitutions system should ensure addressing the following tasks: 
1) Support of creation of new innovation companies, R&D commodization processes, and 
technology transfers; 
2) Ensuring conditions of a rapid expansion of successful innovation firms, including by 
compensating for market failures and granting access to financing at different stages of 
the innovation cycle; 
3) Ensuring a demonstration effect for the economy, boosting private resources in the inno-
vation sphere. 
The businesses’ assessment1 of the development institutions’ impact allows the following 
conclusions: on the one hand, their influence on the corporate sector’s innovation perform-
ance may appear fairly limited: only 4% of enterprises in the sample noted the presence of 
such an effect from VEB and ROSNANO’s operations, while another 2% of respondents 
noted the same with regard to venture funds’ operations. On the other hand, however, those 
are not small figures, given the narrow focus of the development institutions’ operations and 
comparing them with the respective figure of the impact of financing of innovation projects in 
the frame of the FTP (8% of respondents). 
More important is what category of enterprises noted a positive effect from development 
institutions’ operations. Having run a regression analysis, we found out that it is corporations 
with government participation and those with a solid financial standing which more often cite 
a positive effect from Vnesheconombank and ROSNANO’s operations. Meanwhile, it is me-
dium-sized companies (with up to 250 employees), corporations with government participa-
tion and those with a solid financial standing which more often ascertained the same with re-
gard to venture funds. As a positive fact, let us note that the positive effect in question was 
more often cited (given other conditions being equal) by companies with a higher level of 
spending on technological innovation, a positive dynamic of such costs and boasting cutting-
edge innovation produce. 
                                                 
1 On the basis of a survey on executives of 600 medium-sized and large industrial corporations run in October-
November 2011 and individual interim findings of the project of the Interdepartmental analytical center on as-
sessment of various instruments of encouragement of innovation implemented for the benefit of the RF Ministry 
of Education and Science. 
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It appears quite logical that the development institutions’ operations generally prove more 
significant to robust companies, while venture funds’ operations in particular – to smaller-
sized companies. That said, interpretation of some shift of the “group of beneficiaries” to-
wards companies with government participation is a tricky question. We assume there might 
be at least two explanatory hypotheses: (1) being controlled by the state, public development 
institutions’ focus of operations is shifted toward support of companies with government par-
ticipation; (2) where private corporations receive funding from public development institu-
tions, they face the need to give up a fraction of corporate control in the course of implemen-
tation of an investment project, while companies with government participation are not 
particularly concerned about such anti-motivations. 
An accelerated and multidirectional expansion of Russian development institutions, par-
ticularly coupled with an insufficiently developed independent audit of their performance, in-
evitably increases risks associated with the rise (intensification) of certain systemic imbal-
ances in their operations. It is possible to identify the following tentative groups of such 
imbalances: 
• «vertical» ones, which appear to be determined by an insufficient balance of support at dif-
ferent stages of innovation ; 
• «horizontal», which are associated with thematic directions of development institutions’ 
operations and peculiarities of their prioritization; and 
• Institutional ones, determined by the normative framework of conditions of provision of 
support and a loose combination of instruments applied.  
Let us first examine general trends of development of the Russian market for investment at 
venture stages vis-à-vis mature innovation economies. Between 2005 and 2010, Russia first 
posted some advanced growth of the level (vs. GDP) of investment at venture stages followed 
by its stabilization at the level of 0.1% of GGDP since 2008 (Fig. 7), with the indicator in 
question nationwide during the whole period being substantially lower than in countries with 
a mature venture industry, such as US and Finland and thus far having exhibited no trend to 
its post-crisis growth.  
While analyzing operations on the Russian market for venture and direct investment sec-
tor-wise, it should be noted that thus far it has not undergone any substantial, sustained shifts 
in terms of “diversification” of thematic directions. According to RAVI1, in 2007–2010, in-
vestment in three sectors – telecommunications, financial services and consumer market – 
accounted for 70-80% in the structure of private equity and venture funds’ investments. 
Throughout the period in question, investments in the medicine and health care sector were 
being steadily on the rise. After the crisis 2009 tendencies to growth in investment renewed in 
such sectors and energy, industrial equipment, agriculture, while investment activity in such 
sectors as chemicals, biotechnology, light industry, and environmental management remained 
low. 
The public institutions’ operations at venture stages also gravitate more toward “tradi-
tional” thematic direction, though with some attention being paid to certain other sectors, 
such as medicine and energy engineering. 
                                                 
1 Russian Association for Direct and Venture Investment. Direct and venture investment in Russia 2010. A pre-
liminary market review. 2011  
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* Venture stages include the seed, initial and early stages (by the RAVI methodology) and analogous stages as 
classified overseas. 
Source: assessments of the Interdepartmental analytical center on the basis of data of RAVI (Russia), NVСA 
(UD), EVСA (Germany). 
Fig. 7. Dynamic of the level of Investment at Venture Stages * in Individual  
Countries, as % to GDP 
As to the direct investment market, ROSNANO is particularly active there, but, of course, 
only in the frame of its core mission of development of nanoindustry. Meanwhile, as far as 
such a promising direction as bioindustry is concerned, the existing development institutions 
do not exert any significant influence on its advancement. In our view, due to the industry’s 
huge capital intensiveness and dependence of its development prospects on improvement of 
regulation, it is imperative to establish a specialized PPP-based biotechnological direct in-
vestment fund. There might as well be a certain niche to form other funds (both venture and 
direct investment ones) to focus on such directions as fine chemistry, alternative energy, ro-
botics. 
Despite a certain progress, the Russian industry of venture capital and direct investment 
has still remained unbalanced phase-wise: between 2005-10 investment at the stage of expan-
sion proved nearly 10-fold greater than investment at venture phases, while developed 
economies exhibit a greater level of investment at the latter stages. If in our consideration we 
cross out a ”formal” increase in the share of investment at venture stages during the crisis pe-
riod (determined by contraction of private businesses’ investment activity at expansion 
stages), it can be noted that US demonstrated a tendency to increase in the share of investment 
at venture stages, while in Russia this share was down: in 2005, the proportion of investment 
at venture stages in the aggregate volume of investment at venture stages plus those at expan-
sion stages was over 15.7%, in 2010 it dwindled to 6.3% (Fig. 8). We believe this effect was 
engendered by the strive for practical results from development institutions’ operations in the 
short run and by the shift of operation of the whole system of development institutions toward 
later-, “commercial” stages with more visible direct deliverables. 
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* The category of venture stages comprises seed, initial and early stages (by the RAVI methodology), and their 
analogues in foreign classifications. 
Source: estimates by the Interdepartmental analytical center on the basis of RAVI (Russia) and NVСA (US) 
data. 
Fig. 8. Dynamics of the Proportion of Investment at Venture * Stages in the Volume  
of Investment at Venture and Expansion Stages  
It is common knowledge that it is early stages when the role of the state (and development 
institutions) with regard to support of innovation is critical, as at these stages private initiative 
is missing at most. But the Russian system of public development institutions appears insuffi-
ciently mature as far as the said stages are concerned.  
On the one hand, Russia’s development institutions do play the greatest role at venture 
stages. Thus, we estimated that in 2010 alone, their and their daughter funds’ direct contribu-
tion to the aggregate volume of investment in companies at venture stages accounted for 85% 
(RAVI estimates it at a level of 75%), and another 45% - in the total volume of investment in 
companies at expansion stage (Fig. 9). Let us note the critical role played by the Fund for As-
sistance to Development at the pre-seed stage.  
On the other hand, the main “increase” in Russian development institutions’ activity in 
2010, both investment-wise and in terms of the number of supported projects, was associated 
with later-stage investment. While comparing the magnitude of public development institu-
tions’ operations in terms of different stages of the innovation cycle, an insufficient “broad-
ness” of support (in terms of the number of projects) at venture stages in general (Fig. 10) and 
with regard to seed investment in particular (despite expansion of the RVC’s Seed Investment 
Fund’ operations) is particularly noticeable. This substantially constraints possibilities for pri-
vate investment to embrace later-stage projects and blocs the rise of a steady “flow” of inno-
vation projects.  
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* Assessments by RAVI are used as basic values with regard to aggregate volumes of direct and venture invest-
ment in Russia.  
** The Seed Investment fund, venture funds founded with RVC’s participation, regional venture funds, 
ROSNANO. 
Source: estimates by the Interdepartmental analytical center with the use of RAVI’s estimates of aggregate vol-
umes of direct and venture investment in Russia. 
Fig. 9. Assessment of Contribution* of Public Financial Development Institutions  
(and Funds Created with their Participation)** in Russian Market of Venture and Direct  
Investment in 2010  
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Source: estimates by the Interdepartmental analytical center 
Fig. 10. Estimated Correlation between the Scale of Public Development Institutions’  
Operations on Support of Innovation Projects at Different Stages  
An insufficient project “flow” at the pre-seed and seed stages appears a critical challenge 
to the task of ensuring a broad general economic effect from the development institutions’ 
operation. Let us note the limited nature of grant-based support arrangements in the first 
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place (this modus operandi is noted only for the Fund for Assistance to Innovation and 
Sklokovo Foundation).  
In principle, the state-sponsored grant-based support of projects at the pre-seed stage is un-
folding in Russia, but its magnitude has thus far been far smaller than in the US: the grant-
based support to GDP ratio displayed by the Fund for Assistance to Development of Small 
Forms of Enterprises in the Scientific-Technical Sphere is nearly twice as little as the respec-
tive figure of its US vis-à-vis, the Small Business Innovative Research (Fig. 11). 
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Source: estimates by the Interdepartmental analytical center on the basis of public information about operation 
of the Fund for Assistance to Development of Small Forms of Enterprises in the Scientific-Technical Sphere 
(Russia) and about implementation of SBIR (USA) 
Fig. 11. Level of State Support of projects at the Pre-seed Stage  
But the challenge does not lie solely in the above: it is imperative to pay attention to a 
fairly low size of individual grants the Fund in question is authorized to award (even after the 
cap was raised up to Rb 1mn) vis-à-vis other nations’ practice. Plus, while using such grants, 
there are stringent restrictions with regard to the volume of spending on equipment (which 
objectively is explained by the fact that the Fund’s operation is financed out of the state 
budget in the frame of the R&D expenditure). This constraints possibilities for effective im-
plementation of the pre-seed stage across a string of cash-intensive technological directions.  
We believe that a limited demonstration effect in the innovation sphere from Russian de-
velopment institutions’ operations appears to a significant degree associated with external in-
stitutional constraints, as well as peculiarities of the authorities’ “expectation overhang”. So 
far there have been substantial institutional barriers in place to implementation of the “ven-
ture” model of innovation development basing on a high activity on creation of new innova-
tion businesses and a rapid expansion of successful companies.  
First, the inflow of new entrepreneurs is limited, due to an insufficiently conducive entre-
preneurial environment and negative, rather than positive, public perception of entrepreneur-
ship: more specifically, a recent monitoring of entrepreneurship1 evidences that in 2010 only 
4.3% of Russian residents were going to start their own business in 3 years to come, but, 
                                                 
1 Verkhovskaya.O., Doronina M. National report “Global monitoring of entrepreneurship. Russia. 2010”. High 
School of Management of the St. Petersburg State University, 2011  
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given that entrepreneurs accounted for a. one-third of them, the prospective inflow of entre-
preneurs makes up a meager 2.6% (one of the lowest figures vis-à-vis other countries). The 
same research exposed such fundamental challenges to expansion of entrepreneurship in Rus-
sia (vs. other nations) as a weak cultural background, nascent competition, and a low level of 
availability of venture capital. 
Second, the national policy on support of small-sized business has thus far been to a 
greater degree oriented towards its social mission, that is, a mechanism to generate new job 
opportunities and mitigate social problems, rather than a major driver of economic develop-
ment and emergence of new sectors. There emerged a significant “tax lacuna” for small busi-
nesses, due to which (as well as because of risks of increase of the administrative burden and 
a limited array of instruments of support tailored for small businesses) their motivations to 
transition to (over time) the category of medium-sized ones prove substantially arrested.  
Third, the pace of the process of formation of a civilized market for mergers and takeovers 
has been very slow, which can be ascribed primarily to problems with protection of property 
rights, including intellectual ones, and risks associated with raiders’ operations. Because of 
this, on the one hand, owners’ motivations to capitalize their companies are limited, while 
venture investors have problems with an efficient “walkaway” from corporate capital, on the 
other. 
Fourth, there exist external constraints to a cardinal increase of the number of projects sup-
ported at the pre-seed and seed stages. There of course exists a potential positive short-range 
effect from measures on development of organizational infrastructure for formation of new 
innovation projects (e.g. a model with venture partners for search of projects and assistance in 
preparing high-quality business offers, which is implemented by the Seed Investment Fund). 
But we believe that the future will see an increasing exhaustion of scientific-technological 
capacity across a number of demanded by business thematic directions and an adverse impact 
of the insufficient effectiveness of instruments of assistance to commercialization of R&D 
outputs. 
The government’s underestimation of external constraints and its excessive expectations, 
in our view, lead to a certain deformation of motivations behind, and assessment of, the de-
velopment institutions’ performance. 
The first peculiarity in this regard is the strive to demonstrate to a broad array of stake-
holders notable successes in the innovation sphere already in the short run, at the expense of 
the development institutions’ operation. 
At the development institutions level, this results in stronger motivations to demonstration 
of their outputs, implementation of milestone, “worth-bragging-about” projects. That the de-
velopment institutions have received sizeable resources is an additional factor fuelling the an-
ticipation of significant and understandable to a broad audience deliverables. Conceptual op-
ponents to the development institutions accentuate an insufficient efficiency of their 
contribution to economic development, while individual groups of champions of the govern-
ment’s proactive role in encouragement of innovation criticize them for a slow pace of spend-
ing. 
An inseparable and fundamental component of development institutions’ operation is se-
curing a demonstration effect for private businesses, diffusion of best practices, improvement 
of regulation, the environment for innovation and, ultimately, a gradual overcoming of “mar-
ket failures”. That said, principles of assessment of the development institutions’ performance 
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appear to a far greater degree oriented toward their direct performance metrics, with the 
emphasis on employing formal indicators which characterize the use of resources. 
Due to their profile, development institutions respond to expectations of the public admini-
stration system and various interest groups by boosting the scale of their projects, their 
uniqueness, spending, and by launching new initiatives. 
Second, strive for ensuring dynamic structural shifts, scientific and technological break-
throughs through the development institutions. 
We believe this sometimes results in development institutions’ operation in certain cases 
beginning to drift away from general market trends and investors’ preferences. This problem 
is further exacerbated by the view that capitalization of the development institution and ex-
pansion of their operational scale can help promptly compensate for drawbacks of the invest-
ment climate. Having been oriented toward support of huge projects, development institutions 
become prone to a strong political pressure, which gives rise to preconditions of their follow-
ing the “agent – of - the government” model, rather than the “development institution” one.  
Even with locally efficient operations and successful direct project outputs, such an ap-
proach arrests possibilities to attract private investment in development institutions’ opera-
tion, fuels their hunger for additional public resources and encourages their shift from the PPP 
model to a public-quasipublic partnership one, concentration of the state banks and develop-
ment institutions’ resources on implementation of individual projects. 
Third, the desire to increase direct return from their operation, no readiness for risk-taking 
(costs- wise), strive for localization of all the effects in the frame of the national economy. 
The problem of bolstering the development institutions’ efficiency is often viewed from 
the perspective of the need for their concentration solely on provision of financial support to 
projects implementation, without pursuing any organizational, educational and methodologi-
cal goals. With very stringent criteria of assessment of success of projects they support and 
direct effectiveness of the development institutions’ costs there arise extra motivations to 
shifting main risks with regard to failures in innovation projects implementation onto recipi-
ents of the support. 
Focusing on early stages, development institutions appear objectively limited in delivering 
immediate results, as main positive effects from their operation become visible at later stages. 
In this regard more motives emerge to extend the development institutions’ resources at the 
later stages which are capable to demonstrate the said results. 
Despite the above problems with improvement of the development institutions system 
(which to a significant extent can be ascribed to costs of its rapid growth), basically, it can be 
ascertained that there has been made a substantial progress in the area concerned. More spe-
cifically, development institutions secured the following positive qualitative effects: 
− demonstration to business of possible prospects with regard to obtaining support at differ-
ent stages of development; 
− cementing trust in development institutions on the part of the business community and the 
new, medium-sized business in the first place; 
− working out various new, complex patterns of support of innovation and investment activ-
ity; laying ground for diffusion of respective qualifications and skills;  
− design and promotion of proposals on improvement of market regulation and investment 
climate; 
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− identification of policy bottlenecks and critical challenges in the area of innovation devel-
opment; a substantial public administration system’s progress in appreciation of tasks and 
instruments of innovation policy. 
In conclusion, let us single out the following possible avenues of improvement of the Rus-
sian system of development institutions: 
1. It is imperative to expand the scope of their support of early-stage innovation, primarily at 
the pre-seed and seed stages. For a steady flow of projects to rise it is necessary to sub-
stantially broaden the “array” of the supported projects: up to several thousand – at the 
level of the Fund for Assistance to Development, and up to several hundred – at the level 
of the Seed Investment Fund. 
2. It seems appropriate to expand the scale of grant-based support at early stages (where 
risks are maximum), namely, at the pre-seed one, as well as to spread this mechanism onto 
the seed stage of innovation. It is desirable, in the frame of measures on development of 
the university R&D, to consider a possibility for support of creation by research universi-
ties of special seed funds (capitalization of the existing ones). 
3. With regard to development of grant-based innovation support patterns in Russia, it 
should be noted that a string of nations apply the “matching grants” mechanism to en-
courage innovation development. Good practices evidence that provision of such public 
grants to private businesses appears more effective than tax incentives for innovation1. 
When compared with “regular” grants, the mechanism in question is less exposed to the 
risk of “substitution” of private resources with public ones in the course of exercise of in-
vestment activity, and it to a greater extent helps attract businesses’ extra resources into 
the innovation sphere. 
In principle, in Russia, there is a similar mechanism associated with provision of subsidies 
on financing of innovation projects corporations implement together with universities2. How-
ever, an additional flexibility of this mechanism and prospects of its expansion could be en-
sured either by positioning it as a basic operational vehicle of one of public funds engaged in 
support of innovation activity, or by creating a special fund. 
1. An important source of new innovation projects may become small innovation companies 
created under universities. This appears important from the perspective of expansion of 
the community of innovation-oriented entrepreneurs at the expense of university gradu-
ates: in the frame of the aforementioned monitoring, experts referenced to a substantial 
potential of the university environment in this regard: some 8.5% of students are ready to 
become entrepreneurs3.  
While noting a substantial progress in terms of reduction of normative barriers to creation 
of small-sized innovation firms under universities, it can be ascertained, nonetheless, there 
should be additional measures (mechanisms) in place to support integration of such compa-
nies into global value creation chains. The current emphasis on the number of newly founded 
companies and their focus mostly on local niches arrest potential to their dynamic growth. 
                                                 
1 See, for example: Maloney, William. 2005. “Global Patterns of Innovation”. World Bank 
2 Resolution of the RF Government of 9 April 2010 No. 218 “On measures of state support to development of 
cooperation between Russian institutions of high education and organizations implementing complex projects on 
creation of highly technological production”. 
3 Verkhovskaya.O., Doronina M. National report “Global monitoring of entrepreneurship. Russia. 2010”. High 
School of Management of the St. Petersburg State University, 2011.  
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1. The task to broaden the circle of projects supported at the pre-seed and seed stages cannot 
be solved momentarily, as it requires improvement of conditions of formation of new in-
novation projects and companies. So, it is imperative to increase funding of applied R&D 
at the pre-commercial stage to ensure an accelerated rise of the scientific and technologi-
cal capacity to get university students engaged in conduct of research and commercializa-
tion of research outputs. 
2. Solution to the problem of bolstering the development institutions’ operational efficacy 
appears in many ways associated with implementation of measures on attraction of for-
eign investors to participate in their capital. This allows counting on a fair assessment of 
the quality of governance and “value” of the respective structures, improvement of selec-
tion of projects to support, and mitigation of the risk of a “timeserving” influence of the 
state. So far it has been only ROSNANO which has developed plans to attract private in-
vestors; however, such medium-term tasks seem rational for the Russian Venture Com-
pany and – in a more remote future – for Vnesheconombank (upon separation from it the 
Bank for Development per se and its transformation into an adequate organizational and 
legal form), too. 
3. It is imperative to promote efforts with regard to dissemination of development institu-
tions’ best operational practices, public demonstration of success stories associated with 
specific projects, and special educational programs. It is critical to ensure a substantial 
progress in monitoring and assessment of qualitative, indirect effects from development 
institutions’ operations1; meanwhile, assessment of such external effects requires organi-
zation of regular independent audit. 
6.4. Bankruptcies in 2009–2011: Post-crisis Dynamics; New Trends; Regulation 
6 . 4 . 1 .  D y n a mi c s  o f  B a n k r u p t c i e s  ( 2 0 0 9 – 2 0 1 1 )  
The overall situation in the field of bankruptcy over the period under consideration was 
shaped by the following four key trends. 
1. First of all, it is necessary to note the beginning, in first half-year 2011, of a decline in 
the number of bankruptcies and the number of petitions in bankruptcy submitted to court that 
followed the period of growth of these indices in 2009–2010. Thus, over the period of 2009–
2010, the number of court decisions concerning the recognition of a debtor to be bankrupt and 
the initiation of a proceeding in bankruptcy rose by more than 15% (in 2008 – 13.9 thousand; 
in 2009 – 15.5 thousand; in 2010 – 16 thousand cases2). In the first half-year 2011, there oc-
curred a significant drop (by nearly 20%) in the number of petitions in bankruptcy filed with 
courts of justice (first half-year 2010 – 21,037; first half-year 2011 – 16,853); and a drop by 
13.5%, on the same period of 2010, in the number of decisions issued to the effect that a rele-
vant debtor should be deemed to be bankrupt (first half-year 2010 – 8,047; first half-year 
                                                 
1 See, also: Simachev Yu., Kuzyk M. Institutions in Development.- Direct investment, 2010, No. 4. 
2 Out of 16,009 decisions on deeming a debtor to be bankrupt and initiating a proceeding in bankruptcy in 2010:  
− 3.2% (or 508 cases) have to do with state and municipal unitary enterprises; 
− 13.1% (or 4,882 cases) have to do with individual entrepreneurs; 
− 5% (or 800 cases) have to do with agricultural producers; 
− 1.4% (or 224 cases) have to do with financial institutions. 
